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Abstract
Agreement plays a central role in distributed systems working on a common task. The increasing size of modern distributed
systems makes them more susceptible to single component failures. Fault-tolerant distributed agreement protocols rely for the most
part on leader-based atomic broadcast algorithms, such as Paxos. Such protocols are mostly used for data replication, which requires
only a small number of servers to reach agreement. Yet, their centralized nature makes them ill-suited for distributed agreement at
large scales. The recently introduced atomic broadcast algorithm ALLCONCUR enables high throughput for distributed agreement
while being completely decentralized. In this paper, we extend the work on ALLCONCUR in two ways. First, we provide a formal
specification of ALLCONCUR that enables a better understanding of the algorithm. Second, we formally prove ALLCONCUR’s
safety property on the basis of this specification. Therefore, our work not only ensures operators safe usage of ALLCONCUR, but
also facilitates the further improvement of distributed agreement protocols based on ALLCONCUR.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed systems working on a common task often have a shared state. Typically, the ordering of updates to this shared
state is relevant, i.e. only identical ordering guarantees identical resulting states. Thus, to ensure identical distributed states,
distributed agreement is required. Both for systems handling critical data and very large systems, the ability to sustain failures
is crucial. For the former, inconsistencies are unacceptable, for the latter, failures become so common, that the lack of fault
tolerance becomes a performance issue. Atomic broadcast algorithms enable fault-tolerant distributed agreement.
In this paper we formally specify ALLCONCUR [25], a protocol that provides distributed agreement through a leaderless
concurrent atomic broadcast algorithm under the assumption of partial synchrony ( II-B). ALLCONCUR1 enables decentralized
distributed agreement among a group of servers that communicate over an overlay network described by a sparse digraph.
Moreover, it requires subquadratic work per server for every agreement instance and it significantly reduces the expected
agreement time by employing an early termination mechanism. ALLCONCUR’s specification is based on the original description
of the protocol ( III). In addition, we provide a mechanically verifiable proof of ALLCONCUR’s safety ( IV); the proof follows
the steps of the informal proof described in the original paper [25].
A. Related work and motivation
Atomic broadcast plays a central role in fault-tolerant distributed systems; for instance, it enables the implementation of
both state machine replication [27], [13] and distributed agreement [25], [29]. As a result, the atomic broadcast problem
sparked numerous proposals for algorithms [8]. Many of the proposed algorithms rely on a distinguished server (i.e., a leader)
to provide total order; yet, the leader may become a bottleneck, especially at large scale. As an alternative, total order can
be achieved by destinations agreement [8], [5], [25]. On the one hand, destinations agreement enables decentralized atomic
broadcast algorithms; on the other hand, it entails agreement on the set of delivered messages and, thus, it requires consensus.
Most consensus algorithms and implementations are leader-based [14], [15], [17], [22], [3], [24], [4], [6]; thus, one server
is on the critical path for all communication. Several attempts were made to increase performance by adopting a multi-leader
approach [21], [18], [19]. Still, such approaches assume the overlay network is described by a complete digraph, i.e., each
server can send messages to any other server. In general, leader-based consensus algorithms are intended for data replication,
where the number of replicas (i.e., servers) are bounded by the required level of data reliability [24]. Distributed agreement
has no such bound—the number of agreeing servers is an input parameter and it can be in the range of thousands or more.
Thus, solutions that rely (for communication) on a complete digraph are not suitable for distributed agreement.
ALLCONCUR provides leaderless consensus and, thus, leaderless atomic broadcast, by using (as overlay network) any digraph
with a vertex-connectivity exceeding the maximum number of tolerated failures. The original paper provides both a detailed
1We use ALLCONCUR to refer to both the distributed agreement protocol and the atomic broadcast algorithm.
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description of the ALLCONCUR algorithm and an informal proof of its correctness [25]. Yet, a formal specification allows
for a better understanding of the algorithm and provides the basis for a formal proof of correctness. To formally specify
ALLCONCUR’s design, we use the TLA+ specification language [16]. Then, we use the TLA+ Proof System (TLAPS) [7] to
formally proof that ALLCONCUR’s specification guarantees safety. Both the specification and the mechanically verifiable proof
are publicly available [23].
Key contributions. In summary, our work makes two key contributions:
• a formal specification of ALLCONCUR—a distributed agreement protocol that relies on a leaderless concurrent atomic
broadcast algorithm ( III);
• a formal proof of ALLCONCUR’s safety property ( IV).
II. OVERVIEW
This section describes the system model we consider for solving the atomic broadcast problem ( II-A) and it provides an
overview of ALLCONCUR and its early termination mechanism ( II-B).
A. The atomic broadcast problem
We consider n servers that are subject to a maximum of f fail-stop failures. The servers communicate via messages according
to an overlay network, described by a digraph G—server p can send a message to another server q if G has an edge (p, q).
The communication is reliable, i.e., messages cannot be lost, only delayed; also, message order is preserved by both edges
and nodes. We use the terms node and server interchangeably.
To formaly define atomic broadcast, we use the notations from Chandra and Toueg [5]: m is a message (that is
uniquely identified); A-broadcast(m) and A-deliver(m) are communication primitives for broadcasting and delivering messages
atomically; and sender(m) denotes the server that A-broadcasts m. Then, any (non-uniform) atomic broadcast algorithm must
satisfy four properties [5], [11]:
• (Validity) If a non-faulty server A-broadcasts m, then it eventually A-delivers m.
• (Agreement) If a non-faulty server A-delivers m, then all non-faulty servers eventually A-deliver m.
• (Integrity) For any message m, every non-faulty server A-delivers m at most once, and only if m was previously A-
broadcast by sender(m).
• (Total order) If two non-faulty servers p and q A-deliver messages m1 and m2, then p A-delivers m1 before m2, if and
only if q A-delivers m1 before m2.
Integrity and total order are safety properties; validity and agreement are liveness property ( III-D). If validity, agreement and
integrity hold, the broadcast is reliable [11], [5]. We consider reliable broadcast algorithms that use (as overlay networks)
digraphs with the vertex-connectivity exceeding f ; thus, despite any f failures, the servers remain connected. Moreover, we
consider atomic broadcast algorithms that provide total order through destinations agreement [8]—all non-faulty servers reach
consensus on the set of messages to be A-delivered in a deterministic order.
In a synchronous round-based model [2, Chapter 2], consensus requires (in the worst case) at least f +1 rounds [1]. Clearly,
if G is used as overlay network, consensus requires (in the worst case) f + Df (G, f) rounds, where Df (G, f) denotes G’s
fault diameter—G’s diameter after removing any f nodes [12]. Yet, always assuming the worst case is inefficient: It is very
unlikely for the number of rounds to exceed Df (G, f), if the mean time between failures is long compared to the length of
rounds [25].
B. ALLCONCUR
We consider ALLCONCUR [25]—a leaderless concurrent atomic broadcast algorithm that adopts a novel early termination
mechanism to avoid assuming always the worst case. ALLCONCUR is round-based: In every round, every server A-broadcasts
a (possibly empty) message and then A-delivers all known messages in a deterministic order. Since a synchronous model
is impractical, while an asynchronous model makes solving consensus impossible [9], ALLCONCUR assumes the following
model of partial synchrony—message delays can be approximated by a known distribution [25]. Under this assumption, a
heartbeat-based failure detector (FD) [5]—every server sends heartbeats to its successors and, if it fails, the successors detects
the lack of heartbeats—can be treated (with a certain probability) as a perfect FD. Specifically, completeness (i.e., all failures
are eventually detected) is deterministically guaranteed, while accuracy (i.e., no server is falsely suspected to have failed) is
probabilistically guaranteed [25].
ALLCONCUR’s early termination mechanism uses failure notifications to track A-broadcast messages. Every server maintains
a tracking digraph for every A-broadcast message. The nodes of a tracking digraph are the servers suspected to have the A-
broadcast message, while the edges indicate the suspicion of how the message was transmitted. To stop tracking an A-broadcast
message, a server must either receive the message or suspect only failed servers to have the message. A server can safely
A-deliver its known messages once it stops tracking all A-broadcast messages ( IV).
The early termination mechanism relies on the following proposition:
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Fig. 1: (a) Overlay network connecting nine servers. (b) Server p6 tracking p0’s message m0 within a GS(9, 3) digraph. Dotted
red nodes indicate failed servers. Dashed gray nodes indicate servers from which p6 received failures notifications (i.e, dashed
red edges). Solid green nodes indicate servers suspected to have m0.
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Fig. 2: ALLCONCUR system design from the perspective of a server p. Boxes depict the state (i.e., the variables), while arrows
indicate the flow of information.
Proposition 1. If a non-faullty server receives an A-broadcast message and, subsequently, reliably broadcasts a failure
notification, any other non-faulty server receives the A-broadcast message prior to the failure notification.
The reason Proposition 1 holds is twofold: (1) a non-faulty server sends further (to its successors) any message it receives
for the first time; and (2) message order is preserved by both edges and nodes.
To illustrate the early termination mechanism we consider an example similar to the one in the ALLCONCUR paper [25]:
n = 9 servers (p0, . . . , p8) connected through a GS(n, d) digraph [28] with d = 3 the digraph’s degree (see Figure 1a). The
digraph is regular and optimally connected [20], i.e., the vertex-connectivity equals the degree; hence, f = 2. Figure 1b shows
the changes to the tracking digraph used by p6 to track p0’s message m0 under the following failure scenario: p0 fails after
sending m0 only to p5, which receives m0, but fails without sending it further. When p6 receives the first notification of
p0’s failure, for example originating from p4, it adds to the digraph all of p0’s successors except for p4, the sender of the
notification—p6 suspects that, before p0 failed, it sent m0 to all its successors, except p4, which could not have received m0
from p0. Had p4 received m0 from p0, then m0 would have arrived to p6 before the failure notification (cf. Proposition 1).
Also, p6 tracks m0 until it only suspects failed servers to have it; only then is p6 sure no non-faulty server has m0 and stops
tracking it.
III. ALLCONCUR: DESIGN SPECIFICATION
We use TLA+ [16] to provide a formal design specification of ALLCONCUR [23]. In addition to the number of servers n
and the fault tolerance f ( II-A), we define S to be the set of servers and E the set of directed edges describing the overlay
network; clearly, E ⊆ S ×S . To define the digraph G (i.e., the overlay network), we use the Graphs module [16]: G is defined
as a record whose node field is S and edge field is E . We assume that G’s vertex-connectivity is larger than f .
We split the design of ALLCONCUR into three modules: (1) an atomic broadcast (AB) module; (2) a networking (NET)
module; and (3) a failure detector (FD) module. Figure 2 illustrates the three modules together with the variables describing
ALLCONCUR’s state; moreover, the arrows indicate the flow of information, e.g., receiving a failure notification updates the
set F [p], which leads to the update of the tracking digraphs in g[p] ( III-A). The AB module is the core of ALLCONCUR’s
design ( III-A). It exposes two interfaces at every server p ∈ S : the input interface Abcast(p), to A-broadcast a message;
and the output interface Adeliver(p), to A-deliver all known A-broadcast messages. The AB module relies on the other two
modules for interactions between servers: the NET module ( III-B) provides an interface for asynchronous message-based
communication; and the FD module ( III-C) provides information about faulty servers [5].
M g F nf ab done sendBuf recvBuf recvMsg FD
Abcast(p) [p] [p][p] - - [p] - - - - -
Adeliver(p) - - - - - [p] - - - -
RecvBCAST(p,m) [p] [p][m.o] - - - - - - - -
RecvFAIL(p,m) - [p] [p][m.t] - - - - - - -
Fail(p) - - - [p] - - - - - -
SendMsg(p, . . .) - - - - - - [p] - - -
TXMsg(p) - - - - - - [p] [q ∈ p+(G)] - -
DeliverMsg(p) - - - - - - - [p] [∗] -
DetectFail(p, q) - - - - - - - [p] - [p][q]
TABLE I: The effect of the next-state relations on ALLCONCUR’s state. The brackets [] indicate what elements of the variables
are modified; [∗] indicates that the entire variable is modified. Also, p+(G) denotes the set of successors of p in G; m.o
denotes the server that first sent message m; and m.t denotes the server targeted by a failure notification m, i.e., the failed
server.
A. The atomic broadcast module
Let p ∈ S be any server. Then, the state of the AB module is described by the values of four variables (see Figure 2):
(1) M [p] is the set of A-broadcast messages known by p; actually, M [p] contains the messages owners, i.e., M [p] ⊆ S .
(2) g[p] is an array of n tracking digraphs, one per server; the digraph g[p][q] is used by p to track the message A-broadcast
by q. (3) F [p] is an array of n sets, one per server; the set F [p][q] contains all servers from which p received notifications
of q’s failure. (4) flag [p] is a record with three binary fields—nf indicates whether p is non-faulty, ab indicates whether p
A-broadcast its message, and done indicates whether p terminated. For ease of notation, we omit the flag prefix and refer to
the three flags as nf [p], ab[p] and done[p], respectively.
Initial state. Initially, all sets in both M [p] and F [p] are empty—p neither knows of any A-broadcast message nor has
received any failure notifications. For any q ∈ S , g[p][q] contains only q as node—p suspects that each message is only known
by their owner. Also, p is initially non-faulty and it has neither A-broadcast its message nor terminated.
Next-state relations. The AB module defines six operators that specify all the possible state transitions (see Table I). In
addition to the two exposed interfaces, i.e., Abcast(p) and Adeliver(p), p can perform the following four actions: (1) receive
a message, i.e., ReceiveMessage(p); (2) invoke the NET module for transmitting a message, i.e., TXMsg(p) ( III-B); (3) fail,
i.e., Fail(p); and (4) invoke the FD module for detecting the failure of a predecessor q ∈ S , i.e., DetectFail(p, q) ( III-C).
The Abcast(p) operator updates M [p], g[p] and ab[p]—it adds p to M [p]; it removes all servers from g[p][p].node; and
it sets the ab[p] flag. Also, it sends p’s message further by invoking the SendMsg operator of the NET module ( III-B). The
main precondition of the operator is that p has not A-broadcast its message already; hence, a message can be A-broadcast at
most once.
The Adeliver(p) operator sets the done[p] flag; as a result, p can A-deliver the messages in M [p] in a deterministic order.
The main precondition of the operator is that all p’s tracking digraphs are empty, i.e., g[p][q].node = ∅, ∀q ∈ S . In Section IV,
we show that this precondition is sufficient for safety.
The ReceiveMessage(p) operator invokes the DeliverMsg operator of the NET module; as a result, the least recent
message from the recvBuf is stored into recvMsg ( III-B). ALLCONCUR distinguishes between A-broadcast messages and
failure notifications. For both, the o field indicates the server that first sent the message, i.e., the owner; also, the t field of a
failure notification indicates the server suspected to have failed, i.e., the target. When p receives a message m, it invokes one
of the following operators—RecvBCAST(p,m) or RecvFAIL(p,m). To avoid resends, both operators are enabled only if p has
not already received m.
The RecvBCAST(p,m) operator updates both M [p] and g[p]—it adds m.o to M [p]; and it removes all servers from
g[p][m.o].node . Also, it sends m further by invoking the SendMessage operator of the NET module ( III-B). In addition, if
p has not A-broadcast its message, receiving m triggers the Abcast(p) operator. One of the precondition of the operator is
that m was A-broadcast by its owner; although this condition is ensured by design, it facilitates the proof of the integrity
property ( IV).
The RecvFAIL(p,m) operator updates both F [p] and g[p]—it adds m.o to F [p][m.t] and updates every tracking digraph,
in g[p], that contains m.t. Updating the tracking digraphs is the core of ALLCONCUR’s early termination mechanism and we
describe it in details in Section III-A1.
The Fail(p) operator clears the nf [p] flag. As a result, all of p’s operators are disabled—ALLCONCUR assumes a fail-stop
model. The main precondition of the operator is that less than f servers have already failed.
TXMsg(p) and DetectFail(p, q) are discussed in Section III-B and Section III-C, respectively.
1) Updating the tracking digraphs: Tracking digraphs are trivially updated when p adds an A-broadcast message to the
set M [p] and, as a result, removes all the servers from the digraph used (by p) to track this message. Updating the tracking
digraphs becomes more involved when p receives a failure notification. Let pt be the target and po the owner of a received
failure notification, i.e., po detected pt’s failure. Then, p updates every tracking digraph, in g[p], that contains pt. Let g[p][p∗]
be such a digraph; if, after the update, g[p][p∗] contains only servers known by p to have failed, then it is completely pruned—p
is certain no non-faulty server can have m∗. We specify two approaches to update g[p][p∗]. The first approach follows the
algorithm described in the ALLCONCUR paper [25]; yet, due to its recursive specification, it is not suitable for the TLA+
Proof System (TLAPS) [7]. The second approach constructs the tracking digraph from scratch, using the failure notifications
from F [p]; yet, it requires the TLA+ Model Checker [16] to enumerate all paths of a digraph.
First approach—Recursive specification. Let p+t (g[p][p∗]) be the set of pt’s successors in g[p][p∗]. Then, if p
+
t (g[p][p∗]) 6=
∅, then p already received another notification of pt’s failure, which resulted in p suspecting pt to have sent (before failing)
m∗ to its other successors, including po; thus, after receiving the failure notification, p removes the edge (pt, po) from g[p][p∗].
Removing an edge, may disconnect some servers from the root p∗; intuitively, these servers cannot have received m∗ from
any of the other suspected servers and thus, are removed from g[p][p∗].
Yet, if p+t (g[p][p∗]) = ∅ (i.e., this is the first notification of pt’s failure p receives), then, we update g[p][p∗] using a recursive
function that takes two arguments—a FIFO queue Q and a digraph td . Initially, Q contains all the edges (in G) connecting
pt to its successors (except po) and td = g[p][p∗]. Let (x, y) be an edge extracted from Q. Then, if y ∈ g[p][p∗], (i.e., y is
suspected by p to have m∗), the edge (x, y) is added to td (i.e., p suspects y got m∗ from x). If y /∈ g[p][p∗], y is also added
to td (i.e., p suspects y has m∗). In addition, if F [p][y] 6= ∅ (i.e., y is known by p to have failed), the edges connecting y to
its successors (expect those known to have failed) are added to Q. Finally, the function is recalled with the updated Q and td .
The recursion ends when Q is empty.
Properties of tracking digraphs. From the recursive specification, we deduce the following four invariants that uniquely
define a non-empty tracking digraph, denoted by TD(p, p∗):
(I1) it contains its root, i.e., p∗ ∈ TD(p, p∗).node;
(I2) it contains all the successors of every server (in the digraph) known to have failed, except those successors from which
failure notifications were received, i.e.,
∀TD(p, p∗).node : F [p][q] 6= ∅ ⇒ ∀qs ∈ q+(G) \ F [p][q] : qs ∈ TD(p, p∗).node;
(I3) it contains only edges that connect a server (in the digraph) known to have failed to all its successors, except those
successors from which failure notifications were received, i.e.,
∀(e1, e2) ∈ TD(p, p∗).edge : (F [p][e1] 6= ∅ ∧ e2 ∈ e+1 (G) \ F [p][e1]);
(I4) it contains only servers that are either the root or the successor of another server (in the digraph) known to have failed,
except those successors from which failure notifications were received, i.e.,
∀q ∈ TD(p, p∗).node : (q = p∗ ∨ (∃qp ∈ TD(p, p∗).node : ∧ F [p][qp] 6= ∅
∧ q ∈ q+p (G) \ F [p][qp])).
The intuition behind invariant I1 is straightforward—while tracking p∗’s message, p always suspects p∗ to have it. Invariants
I2 and I3 describe how a tracking digraph expands. The successors of any server q, which is both suspected to have m∗ and
known to have failed, are suspected (by p) to have received m∗ directly from q before it failed. Yet, there is one exception—
successors from which p already received notifications of q’s failure. Receiving a notification of q’s failure before receiving
m∗ entails the sender of the notification could not have received m∗ directly from q (cf. Proposition 1).
I1, I2 and I3 are necessary but not sufficient for a non-empty digraph to be a tracking digraph. As an example, we consider
nine servers connected through a GS(9, 3) digraph [28] (see Figure 3a). While p6 is tracking m0, it receives two notification,
one from p4 indicating p0’s failure and another from p7 indicating p2’s failure; i.e., F [p6][p0] = {p4} and F [p6][p2] = {p7}.
Clearly, the digraph K¯9(p6) illustrated in Figure 3b satisfies the first three invariants. Yet, there is not reason for p6 to suspect
that p2 has m0.
For sufficiency, invariant I4 is needed. Together with I3, I4 requires that p suspects only those servers that are connected
through failures to the root p∗. In other words, for p to suspect a server q, there must be a sequence of servers starting with
p∗ and ending with q such that every server preceding q is both known to have failed and suspected to have sent m∗ to the
subsequent server. Note that a server is always connected through failures to itself. Figure 3c shows the actual digraph used
by p6 to track m0 in the above example.
Second approach—TLAPS specification. We use the above invariants to provide a non-recursive specification of a non-
empty tracking digraph. Let Kn be a complete digraph with n nodes; clearly, Kn satisfies I1 and I2. Let K¯n(p) be a digraph
obtained from Kn by removing all edges not satisfying I3 (see Figure 3b for nine servers connected through a GS(9, 3)
digraph). Then, the set TD(p, p∗).node contains any node in K¯n(p) that is either p∗ or (according to p) is connected to p∗
(a) GS(9, 3) (b) K¯9(p6) (c) g[p6][p0]
Fig. 3: (a) An overlay network connecting nine servers; (b) a digraph that satisfies I1, I2 and I3; and (c) the digraph used by
p6 to track m0. Both digraphs consider nine servers connected through a GS(9, 3) digraph [28] and are based on two failure
notifications received by p6 (indicated by dashed edges), one from p4 indicating p0’s failure and another from p7 indicating
p2’s failure. Note that p4 /∈ g[p6][p0].
through failures, i.e.,
{q ∈ K¯n(p).node : ∨ q = p∗ (1)
∨ ∃pip∗,q(K¯n(p)) : F [p][x] 6= ∅, ∀x ∈ pip∗,q(K¯n(p)) \ {q}},
where pip∗,q(K¯n(p)) is a path in K¯n(p) from p∗ to q. Note that when removing a node from K¯n(p) we also remove all the
edges incident on that node. Using TLAPS, we prove that this specification satisfies all four invariants [23].
B. The networking module
The NET module specifies an interface for asynchronous message-based communication; the module assumes that servers
communicate through an overlay network. The interface considers three constants: (1) S , the set of servers; (2) G, the digraph
that describes the overlay network; and (3) Message , the set of existing messages. We assume that every message has a field
o indicating the server that first sent it.
Let p ∈ S be any server. Then, the state of the NET module is described by the values of three variables (see Figure 2):
(1) sendBuf [p], is p’s sending buffer; (2) recvBuf [p], is p’s receiving buffer; and (3) recvMsg , is the latest received message.
Note that while recvBuf [p] is a sequence of received messages, sendBuf [p] is a sequence of tuples, with each tuple consisting
of a message and a sequence of destination servers. Also, both buffers act as FIFO queues. In the initial state, the buffers are
empty sequences; the initial value of recvMsg is irrelevant.
Next-state relations. The NET module defines three operators that specify all the possible state transitions (see Table I). The
operators consists of the three main actions performed in message-based communication—sending, transmitting and delivering
a message. To describe the three operators, let msgs be a sequence of messages and nf a mapping S → {0, 1} indicating the
non-faulty servers.
The SendMsg(p, msgs, nf ) operator, updates sendBuf [p] by appending tuples consisting of messages from msgs with their
destinations; for every message m, the set of destinations consist of p’s non-faulty successors, except for m.o. Note that the
SendMsg operator has no precondition.
The TXMsg(p) operator sends m, the next message from sendBuf [p], to q, one of m’s destinations; m’s sequence of
destinations is updated by removing q; when there are no more destinations, m is removed from sendBuf [p]. Also, m is
appended to recvBuf [q]. As a precondition, the send buffer of p must not be empty.
The DeliverMsg(p) operator updates recvBuf [p] by removing a message (i.e., the least-recent received) and storing it in
recvMsg . Note that recvMsg is only a temporary variable used by the AB module to access the delivered message (i.e., the
ReceiveMessage operator). As a precondition, the receive buffer of p must not be empty.
C. The failure detector module
The FD module provides information about faulty servers. It specifies a FD that guarantees both completeness and accuracy,
i.e., a perfect FD [5]. The specification assumes a heartbeat-based FD with local detection: Every server sends heartbeats to
its successors; once it fails, its successors detect the lack of heartbeats. The module considers two constants: (1) S , the set of
servers; and (2) G, the digraph that describes the overlay network.
Let p ∈ S be any server. Then, the state of the FD module is described by the values of one variable (see Figure 2)—FD [p], is
an array of n flags, one per server; FD [p][q] indicates whether p has detected q’s failure. Clearly, FD [p][q] = 1⇒ q ∈ p+(G).
Initially, all flags in FD [p] are cleared.
Next-state relation. The FD module defines only one operator, DetectFail(p, q), that specifies the state transition when
p detects q’s failure; i.e., the FD [p][q] flag is set (see Table I). The operator has a set of preconditions. First, p must be both
non-faulty and a successor of q. Second, q must be faulty, i.e., nf [q] = 0; this condition guarantees the accuracy property
required by a perfect FD [5].
Once a failure is detected, the AB module must be informed. The FD module invokes the NET module to append a
notification of q’s failure to recvBuf [p] (see Figure 2). This ensures that any A-broadcast messages sent by q to p that were
already transmitted (i.e., added to recvBuf [p]) are delivered by p before its own notification of q’s failure. Thus, Proposition 1
holds: If p receives from qs ∈ q+(G) a notification of q’s failure, then qs has not received from q any message that p did not
already receive. In the above scenario, qs = p.
D. Safety and liveness properties
Using the above specification, we define both safety and liveness properties. First, ALLCONCUR relies on a perfect FD for
detecting faulty servers; hence, it guarantees both accuracy and completeness [5]. Accuracy is a safety property: It requires
that no server is suspected to have failed before actually failing, i.e.,
∀q ∈ S : nf [q] = 1⇒ ∀p ∈ S : FD [p][q] = 0.
Completeness is a liveness property: It requires that all failures are eventually detected, i.e.,
∀q ∈ S : nf [q] = 0 (∀p ∈ q+(G) : nf [p] = 1⇒ FD [p][q] = 1),
where X  Y asserts that whenever X is true, Y is eventually true [16].
Second, any atomic broadcast algorithm must satisfy four properties—validity, agreement, integrity, and total order [11], [5].
Integrity and total order are safety properties. Integrity requires for any message m, every non-faulty server to A-deliver m at
most once, and only if m was previously A-broadcast by its owner q, i.e.,
∀p ∈ S : nf [p] = 1⇒ ∀q ∈M [p] : ab[q] = 1.
Note that the requirement that a server A-delivers m at most once is ensured by construction, i.e., M [p] is a set.
Total order asserts that if two non-faulty servers p and q A-deliver messages m1 and m2, then p A-delivers m1 before m2,
if and only if q A-delivers m1 before m2. Since p A-delivered messages in M [p] in a deterministic order, we replace total
order with set agreement: Let p and q be any two non-faulty servers, then, after termination, M [p] = M [q], i.e.,
∀p, q ∈ S : (nf [p] = 1 ∧ done[p] = 1 ∧ nf [q] = 1 ∧ done[q] = 1)⇒M [p] = M [q].
Validity and agreement are liveness properties. Validity asserts that if a non-faulty server A-broadcasts a message, then it
eventually A-delivers it, i.e.,
∀p ∈ S : ((nf [p] = 1) ∧ ab[p] = 1) a-deliver(p, p),
where X asserts that X is always true [16]; also, a-deliver(p, q) = q ∈M [p]∧ done[p] = 1 asserts the conditions necessary
for p to A-deliver the message A-broadcast by q.
Agreement asserts that if a non-faulty server A-delivers a message A-broadcast by any server, then all non-faulty servers
eventually also A-deliver the message.
∀p, q, s ∈ S :((nf [p] = 1) ∧ a-deliver(p, s)) (nf [q] = 1⇒ a-deliver(q, s)).
To verify that all the above properties hold, we use the TLA+ Model Checker [16], hence, the need for a tracking digraph
specification that does not enumerate all paths of a digraph ( III-A1). For a small number of servers, e.g., n = 3, the model
checker can do an exhaustive search of all reachable states. Yet, for larger values of n the exhaustive search becomes intractable.
As an alternative, we use the model checker to randomly generate state sequences that satisfy both the initial state and the
next-state relations. In the model, we consider the overlay network is described by a GS(n, d) digraph [28]. When choosing
GS(n, d)’s degree, i.e., its fault tolerance ( II-B), we require a reliability target of 6-nines; the reliability is estimated over a
period of 24 hours according to the data from the TSUBAME2.5 system failure history [26], [10], i.e., server MTTF ≈ 2
years.
In addition, we use TLAPS to formally prove the safety properties—the FD’s accuracy and the atomic broadcast’s integrity
and set agreement ( IV). TLAPS does not allow for liveness proofs. However, validity and agreement require ALLCONCUR
to terminate; termination is informally proven in the ALLCONCUR paper [25].
IV. ALLCONCUR: FORMAL PROOF OF SAFETY
Atomic broadcast has two safety properties—integrity and total order. In ALLCONCUR, total order can be replaced by set
agreement ( III-D). In addition, ALLCONCUR relies on a perfect FD for information about faulty servers; thus, for safety,
accuracy must also hold. For all three safety properties, we use TLAPS [16] to provide mechanically verifiable proofs [23].
All three proofs follow the same pattern: We consider each property to be an invariant that holds for the initial state and is
preserved by the next-state relations.
Accuracy. The FD’s accuracy is straightforward to prove. Initially, all flags in FD are cleared; hence, the property holds. Then,
according to the specification of the DetectFail operator ( III-C), setting the flag FD [p][q] for ∀p, q ∈ S is preconditioned
by q previously failing, i.e., nf [q] = 0. Moreover, due to the fail-stop assumption, a faulty server cannot become subsequently
non-faulty. As a result, accuracy is preserved by the next-state relations.
Integrity. Integrity is also straightforward to prove. Initially, all the sets in M are empty; hence, the property holds. Then,
the only two operators that update M are Abcast and RecvBCAST (see Table I). The Abcast(p) operator adds p to M [p] and
also sets the ab[p] flag; hence, integrity is preserved by Abcast. The RecvBCAST(p,m) operator adds m.o to M [p]. Clearly,
receiving a message m entails the existence of a path from m.o to p such that each server on the path has m in its M set (see
Lemma IV.1); this also includes m.o. When m.o adds its message m to M [m.o], it also sets the ab[m.o] flag (according to
the Abcast operator). Thus, integrity is preserved also by RecvBCAST. In practice, to simplify the TLAPS proof, we introduce
an additional precondition for the RecvBCAST(p,m) operator—ab[m.o] = 1 ( III-A).
A. Set agreement
The set agreement property is the essence of ALLCONCUR—it guarantees the total order of broadcast messages. Clearly, set
agreement holds in the initial state, since all done flags are cleared. Moreover, the done flags are set only by the Adeliver
operator (see Table I); thus, we only need to prove set agreement is preserved by Adeliver. We follow the informal proof
provided in the ALLCONCUR paper [25]. We introduce the following lemmas:
Lemma IV.1. Let p be a server that receives p∗’s message m∗; then, there is a path (in G) from p∗ to p such that every
server on the path has received m∗ from its predecessor on the path, i.e.,
∀p, p∗ ∈ S : p∗ ∈M [p]⇒ ∃pip∗,p(G) = (a1, . . . , aλ) :
∧ ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , λ} : p∗ ∈M [ak] (2a)
∧ ∀q ∈ S : (∃k ∈ {1, . . . , (λ− 1)} : ak+1 ∈ F [q][ak])⇒ p∗ ∈M [q]. (2b)
Proof: Equation (2a) is straightforward. Equation (2b) ensures that every server on the path (except p∗) received m∗ from
its predecessor. Any server q that received a failure notification from a server on the path (except p∗) targeting its predecessor
on the path also received m∗ (cf. Proposition 1).
Lemma IV.2. Let p be a non-faulty server that does not receive p∗’s message m∗; let pip∗,ai(G) = (a1, . . . , ai) be a path (in G)
on which ai receives m∗; let (a1, . . . , ai) be also a path in g[p][p∗]. Then, done[p] = 1⇒ (∀q ∈ g[p][p∗].node : F [p][q] 6= ∅).
Proof: A necessary condition for p to terminate is to remove every server aj , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ i from g[p][p∗]. According
to ALLCONCUR’s specification ( III-A1), a server aj can be removed from g[p][p∗] in one of the following scenarios: (1)
p∗ ∈M [p]; (2) @pip∗,aj (g[p][p∗]); and (3) ∀q ∈ g[p][p∗].node : F [p][q] 6= ∅. Clearly, p∗ /∈M [p]. Also, @pip∗,aj (g[p][p∗]) entails
at least the removal of an edge from the (a1, . . . , aj) path. Let (al, al+1), 1 ≤ l < j be one of the removed edges. Then,
al+1 ∈ F [p][al], which entails p∗ ∈M [p] (cf. Lemma IV.1). Thus, p terminates only if ∀q ∈ g[p][p∗].node : F [p][q] 6= ∅.
Lemma IV.3. Let p, q be two non-faulty servers such that p∗ ∈ M [p], but p∗ /∈ M [q]; let pip∗,p(G) = (a1, . . . , aλ) be the
path on which p receives m∗; let ak be a server on pip∗,p(G) such that nf [ak] = 1 and nf [ai] = 0, ∀1 ≤ i < k. Then,
(a1, . . . , ai) , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k is a path in g[q][p∗], i.e., (a1, . . . , ai) ∈ g[q][p∗].
Proof: We use mathematical induction: The basic case is given by invariant I1 ( III-A1), a1 = p∗ ∈ g[q][p∗].node . For
the inductive step, we assume (a1, . . . , ai) ∈ g[q][p∗] for some 1 ≤ i < k. Due to the FD’s completeness property ( III-D),
the failure of aj , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ i is eventually detected; due to the vertex-connectivity of G, q eventually receives the failure
notification of every aj . Moreover, q cannot remove aj , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ i from g[q][p∗] before it receive failure notifications of
every aj (cf. Lemma IV.2). Thus, eventually F [q][ai] 6= ∅ and, since ai+1 /∈ F [q][ai] (cf. Lemma IV.1), ai+1 ∈ g[q][p∗].node
and (ai, ai+1) ∈ g[q][p∗].edge (according to invariants I2 and I3).
Theorem IV.4. ALLCONCUR’s specification guarantees set agreement.
Proof: Let p∗ ∈M [p], but p∗ /∈M [q]. Then, ∃pip∗,p = (a1, . . . , aλ) on which m∗ first arrives at p (cf. Lemma IV.1). Let
ak be a server on pip∗,p such that nf [ak] = 1 and nf [ai] = 0, ∀1 ≤ i < k; the existence of ak is given by the existence of
p, a server that is both non-faulty and on pip∗,p. The path pip∗,p is illustrated in Figure 4; the faulty servers are indicated by
(cf. Lemma IV.1)
subgraph of g[q][p∗] (cf. Lemma IV.3)
a1 =p∗ aλ=pak−1 aka2
m∗ m∗ m∗ m∗m∗ m∗
Fig. 4: The path pip∗,p on which a non-faulty server p first receives m∗ from p∗; every server on the path (except p∗) has
received m∗ from its predecessor. Dotted red boxes indicate faulty servers; in case of no failures, ak = p∗. Solid gray boxes
indicate non-faulty servers. If another non-faulty server q does not receive m∗, then it suspects all servers on the subpath from
a1 to ak to have m∗ and to have received m∗ from their predecessors on the path (except p∗).
dotted red boxes. Before q terminates, ak ∈ g[q][p∗].node (cf. Lemma IV.3). However, due to the precondition of Adeliver(q),
i.e., done[q] = 1 ⇒ g[q][s].node = ∅, ∀s ∈ S ( III-A), ak is subsequently removed from g[q][p∗]. Since m∗ /∈ M [q] and
nf [ak] = 1, ak must have been disconnected from p∗ ( III-A1). Thus, q removed at least one edge from (a1, . . . , ak); let
(ai, ai+1), 1 ≤ i < k be one of the removed edges. Then, ai+1 ∈ F [q][ai] (cf. I3), which entails p∗ ∈M [q] (cf. Lemma IV.1).
1) Reconstructed tracking digraphs: The set agreement proof relies on the following property of tracking digraphs ( III-A1):
If a server q was removed from g[p][p∗], then one of the following is true—(1) p∗ ∈ M [p]; (2) F [p][q] 6= ∅2; and (3)
@pip∗,q(g[p][p∗]). Yet, when the Adeliver(p) operator is enabled, g[p][p∗].node = ∅; checking the existence of a path
pip∗,q(g[p][p∗]) is not possible. Thus, we reconstruct g[p][p∗] from the failure notifications received by p; we denote the
resulted digraph by RTD(p, p∗).
RTD nodes. Constructing the set RTD(p, p∗).node is similar to the TLAPS specification of updating tracking di-
graphs ( III-A1). The difference is twofold. First, if p receives from po a notification of pt’s failure, with pt ∈ RTD(p, p∗),
then p adds all pt’s successors to RTD(p, p∗)—including po. Second, servers are never removed from RTD(p, p∗). Clearly, every
server added at any point to g[p][p∗] is also in RTD(p, p∗)
RTD edges. To construct the set RTD(p, p∗).edge , we first connect (in RTD(p, p∗)) each server known to have failed to its
successors. Then, we remove all the edges on which we are certain p∗’s message m∗ was not transmitted. To identify these
edges we use Proposition 1: If p received from e2 a notification of e1 failure without previously receiving m∗, then the edge
(e1, e2) is not part of RTD(p, p∗), i.e.,
∀e1, e2 ∈ RTD(p, p∗).node : e2 ∈ F [p][e1] ∧ p∗ /∈M [p]⇒ (e1, e2) /∈ RTD(p, p∗).edge. (3)
Some of the remaining edges in RTD(p, p∗) were still not used for transmitting m∗, i.e., the edges for which e2 ∈ F [p][e1]
occurred before p∗ ∈ M [p]. Since the Adeliver(p) operator has no access to the history of state updates modifying either
F [p][e1] or M [p], we cannot identify these edges. Yet, since p∗ ∈ M [p], these edges play no role in proving set agreement.
Clearly, every edge added at any point to g[p][p∗] is also in RTD(p, p∗).
RTD invariant. Using reconstructed tracking digraphs, we redefine the above property of tracking digraphs as an invariant,
referred to as the RTD invariant:
∀p, q, p∗ ∈ S : (q ∈ RTD(p, p∗).node ∧ q /∈ g[p][p∗].node)⇒ p∗ ∈M [p] ∨ F [p][q] 6= ∅ ∨ @pip∗,q(RTD(p, p∗)).
The RTD invariant enables us to formally prove set agreement using TLAPS [23]. Clearly, when Adeliver(q) is enabled,
ak (from the proof of Theorem IV.4) is in RTD(q, p∗), but not in g[q][p∗]. According to the initial assumptions, p∗ /∈M [q] and
F [q][ak] = ∅. Moreover, pip∗,ak = (a1, . . . , ak) was at some point a path in g[q][p∗] (cf. Lemma IV.3); hence, pip∗,ak is also a
path in RTD(p, p∗) (follows from RTD’s construction), which contradicts the RTD invariant.
2) Proving the RTD invariant: To prove the RTD invariant, we follow the same pattern as before: We prove that the invariant
holds for the initial state (since RTD(p, p∗) = g[p][p∗], ∀p, p∗) and is preserved by the only three operators that update the M ,
G or F variables—Abcast; RecvBCAST; RecvFAIL (see Table I). In the following proofs, X ′ denotes the updated value of a
variable X after applying an operator [16].
Theorem IV.5. Both Abcast and RecvBCAST operators preserve the RTD invariant.
Proof: According to the specifications of both Abcast and RecvBCAST, g[p][p∗] 6= g′[p][p∗] ⇒ p∗ ∈ M ′[p] ( III-A);
thus, we assume g[p][p∗] = g′[p][p∗]. In addition, since F [p] = F ′[p], RTD(p, p∗).node = RTD(p, p∗)′.node . Thus, since
M [p] ⊆ M ′[p], the only possibility for the RTD invariant to not be preserved by either operators is ∃pip∗,q(RTD(p, p∗)′). Let
(e1, e2) be one of the edges that enables such a path, i.e., (e1, e2) /∈ RTD(p, p∗).edge ∧ (e1, e2) ∈ RTD(p, p∗)′.edge . As a result,
e2 ∈ F [p][e1] ∧ p∗ /∈M [p] ∧ (e2 /∈ F ′[p][e1] ∨ p∗ ∈M ′[p]) (cf. Equation (3)), which is equivalent to p∗ ∈M ′[p].
Theorem IV.6. The RecvFAIL operator preserves the RTD invariant.
2F [p][q] 6= ∅ is necessary, but not sufficient to remove q from g[p][p∗].
Proof: We consider RecvFAIL(s,m), with s ∈ S ; clearly, M = M ′ (see Table I). Also, if s 6= p, the RTD invariant is
preserved, since also F [p] = F ′[p] and g[p] = g′[p]. Thus, the proof is concerned only with RecvFAIL(p,m). Aside from
adding m.o to F [p][m.t], F = F ′. Clearly, q = m.t⇒ F ′[p][q] 6= ∅. Thus, we make the following assumptions, i.e., the only
non-trivial case (cf. RTD invariant):
(A1) q 6= m.t; (A3) q /∈ g′[p][p∗].node; (A5) F ′[p][q] = ∅;
(A2) q ∈ RTD(p, p∗)′.node; (A4) p∗ /∈M ′[p]; (A6) ∃pip∗,q(RTD(p, p∗)′).
We split the remainder of the proof in three steps.
Step 1. We show that q is in TD(p, p∗)′ ( III-A1). Let pip∗,q(RTD(p, p∗)
′) = (a1, . . . , aλ) (cf. (A6)); then (ak, ak+1) ∈
TD(p, p∗)′.edge, ∀1 ≤ k < λ, since p∗ /∈M ′[p] (cf. (A4)) and no edges are removed from RTD(p, p∗)′ (cf. Equation (3)). Thus,
ak ∈ TD(p, p∗)′.node, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ λ (cf. Equation (1)), which entails the following assumption:
(A7) q ∈ TD(p, p∗)′.node.
Step 2. We show that g[p][p∗] is not updated. If g′[p][p∗] 6= g[p][p∗], then, g′[p][p∗] is either TD(p, p∗)′ or an empty digraph
obtained after completely pruning TD(p, p∗)′. Since the latter option requires F ′[p][s] 6= ∅, ∀s ∈ TD(p, p∗)′.node ( III-A1),
which contradicts (A5) and (A7), we assume g′[p][p∗] = TD(p, p∗)′. Yet, this entails q ∈ g′[p][p∗].node (cf. A7), which
contradicts (A3). Thus, we make the following two equivalent assumptions ( III-A1):
(A8) g[p][p∗] = g
′[p][p∗]; (A9) m.t /∈ g[p][p∗].node.
Step 3. We distinguish between three scenarios—according to the specification ( III-A), g[p][p∗] can be in one of the following
three states: (1) an initial state, i.e., g[p][p∗].node = {p∗}, with F [p][p∗] = ∅; (2) a final state, i.e., g[p][p∗].node = ∅; and (3)
an intermediary state, i.e., g[p][p∗] = TD(p, p∗).
The initial state entails g′[p][p∗].node = {p∗} (cf. (A8)); thus, p∗ is neither m.t (cf. (A9)) nor q (cf. (A3)). Clearly, p∗ 6=
m.t ⇒ F [p][p∗] = F ′[p][p∗]. Moreover, according to (A6) and the construction of RTD(p, p∗)′, p∗ 6= q entails F ′[p][p∗] 6= ∅.
Yet, this contradicts the condition of the initial state, i.e., F [p][p∗] = ∅.
The final state, i.e., g[p][p∗].node = ∅, can be reached only by completely pruning the tracking digraph (cf. (A4) and
M [p] ⊆ M ′[p]); i.e., F [p][s] 6= ∅, ∀s ∈ TD(p, p∗).node ( III-A1). According to invariant I2, no server can be added to
TD(p, p∗), regardless of the received failure notification. As a result, q ∈ TD(p, p∗).node (cf. (A7)) and, thus, F [p][q] 6= ∅. Yet,
since F [p][q] = F ′[p][q] (cf. (A1)), this contradicts (A5).
The intermediary state entails g′[p][p∗] = TD(p, p∗) (cf. (A8)); thus, @pip∗,q(TD(p, p∗)) (cf. (A3)). Nonetheless,
∃pip∗,q(TD(p, p∗)′) = (b1, . . . , bγ) : F ′[p][bk] 6= ∅, ∀1 ≤ k < γ (cf. (A7) and Equation (1)). Moreover, ∃1 ≤ k ≤ γ :
(bk, bk+1) /∈ TD(p, p∗).edge; let k be the smallest index satisfying this property. Then, either F [p][bk] = ∅ or bk+1 ∈ F [p][bk]
(cf. invariant I3). If F [p][bk] = ∅, then bk = m.t (since F ′[p][bk] 6= ∅). Also, (b1, . . . , bk) is a path in TD(p, p∗) (cf.invariants I1,
I2 and I3) and, thus, bk ∈ TD(p, p∗).node , which entails m.t ∈ g′[p][p∗]. Yet, this contradicts (A8) and (A9). If bk+1 ∈ F [p][bk],
then bk+1 ∈ F ′[p][bk] (i.e., F [p][bk] ⊆ F ′[p][bk]), which contradicts (bk, bk+1) /∈ TD(p, p∗)′.edge .
V. CONCLUSION
We have provided both a formal design specification and a formal proof of safety of ALLCONCUR, a leaderless concurrent
atomic broadcast algorithm. Previous work shows the advantage of using ALLCONCUR over classic leader-based approaches,
such as Paxos—it enables higher throughput for distributed agreement while being completely decentralized [25]. This work
builds on ALLCONCUR by both improving the understanding of the algorithm, through a TLA+ design specification, and
formally proving the algorithm’s safety property, using the TLA+ Proof System.
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